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The Chinese had to adopt the nomad bow and the technique of mounted archery before they could meet the nomads on equal terms.

Another factor, according to Lattimore, was the pastoral economy of the nomads which led to migration. Horses and cattle cannot graze on fields that have been cropped by sheep and goats. Therefore, the nomads whose livelihood depended upon their herds and flocks, must continually seek new pastures. The claims to pasturelands and the right of movement led to wars. The continuous wars stimulated the rise of leaders, hard-headed men who survived the hurly-burly of warfare and politics of the steppes and deserts. Finally, a supreme leader emerged who would then weld the various groups into a grand confederation strong enough to encroach upon the neighboring regions for land, for the profits of trade, and for revenue and tribute from the conquered peoples.

According to Lattimore, the nomads who invaded the marginal zone between the steppes and the settled lands, were not pure nomads but were semi-settled. Their wars of conquest were not only for pastures for their herds and flocks but for land, for the riches of the cities, and for the proceeds of commerce. Moreover, the cycles of their invasion and retreat began only a few centuries before the Christian era when they split from the settled peoples on China's northwestern frontier and when they acquired the technology of nomadic warfare. The true nomads on the steppes evolved from the mixed nomads, not vice versa.

The migrations which led to conquest over a wide area, such as those carried out by the Huns, the Turks and the Mongols, normally did not begin with the true nomads but with the mixed nomads, and were caused by (1) a group breaking away from the mixed nomads in order to become true nomads: or (2) a group breaking away from the true nomads in order to revert back to mixed nomadism. The Huns, Turks, and Mongols had fixed bases of operation and their conquests were for land.

Under these circumstances, according to Lattimore, the cycles of nomadic expansion and withdrawal each went through the following process:

1. The maintenance of large armies of mounted warriors to conquer land for the profit of trade and revenue from subject peoples;
2. A dichotomy of nomad society. The nomadic warriors who went forth to conquer and who were left to garrison conquered territories had control of the sources of wealth but declined militarily. The warriors who stayed in the steppes as the military reserve continued to be warlike but gradually became impoverished;
3. A split within the nomad state between those in the conquered areas and those in the steppes, leading to decline and and withdrawal.

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6. Summary

In summary, the workings of the historical process represented

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in these tides of nomadic eruptions can hardly be explained by one set of factors, useful as it may be as a contribution to our understanding of this process. Moreover, each set in turn led into a rather involved pattern. Geography and the highly specialized economies of the nomads, particularly when they had reached the stage of pure nomadism, induced them to seek a more stable base for their evolving power urge than could be found in the steppe lands of Mongolia, from which most of the nomadic conquests emerged. It induced them to push first into the oasis situation of Turkestan with its mixed, richer, more stable but, geographically speaking, more fragmented economy. This aspect helped form the pattern of relationships of the group, which was on its way to conquest of other nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in Central Asia. However, only from the foundation of this economic basis could an effort at conquest of neighboring civilizations be sustained.

The social pattern of development leading a warrior leader to integrate his clan, his tribe, his people, and finally, a confederation of peoples, into a conquest force is interlinked with the previous one. This expansion led to a relative shrinkage of the group that had been carrier of the power urge and more and more force had to be substituted for the self-consciousness of the participants and their community of purpose. In the course of the social development towards conquest and empire building, the initial group gained a feeling of mission but lost its surroundings geographically, economically, and socially. As a rule this change also led to a change in the pattern of emerging leadership: the warrior leader chosen by his own people had to make room for the heir of a diversified empire.

This development again was linked with the development of a relationship to neighboring agricultural societies, particularly China, a relationship that has been understood under the concept of marginality by Krader (The Cultural and Historical Position of the Mongols, Asia Major 3, 1952, 169-183). Economically speaking, this relationship is always one of interdependence. From the Chinese side the natural and necessary exchange of produce was conceived under an evolving series of patterns. In periods of Chinese power ascendancy the nomadic raid pattern was transformed into trade, then into tribute, and then, if necessary, into conquest. However, in periods when a nomadic empire building situation coincided with a decline of Chinese power, the nomads would shake off conquest, resort to raids and to conquest in their turn.

Whatever may have been the causes of the periodic eruption of the nomads, whether they were due to climatic changes or due to concentration and the disintegration of nomadic society, the pattern remained. With clockwork regularity different groups of

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●105 nomads have descended on the marginal zones, such as Turkestan
175 and Inner Mongolia, conquering and absorbing some peoples and
648 pushing others, in a sort of chain reaction, until the reverberations
182 were felt from China Proper in the east to Russia in the west. The history of China's great Northwest cannot be clearly delineated without tracing in broad sweep the see-saw of power between China and the nomadic peoples.

C. Early History to 1644

1. Chou Dynasty

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*175 In antiquity the Northwest region of China was known as the
N province of Yung, one of the nine provinces of ancient China. For
[101] a long time, it was a region inhabited by peoples whom the Chinese called "barbarians," the Ti in the north and the Jung in the west. The founder of the Chou Dynasty, King Wen (circa 12th century B.C.) was himself a "western barbarian." His fief in the Wei River Valley in Shensi, an area which in the early years of Chinese civilization was fertile and fruitful, provided his son, King Wu, with the men and resources for the campaign to gain control over China. Later, as the barbarians of the Northwest became strong, they forced the Chou court to transfer its capital from the Wei River Valley to Honan.

2. Ch'in Dynasty

The region of Shensi, centering around the Wei River Valley, became the fief of the Marquis (later Duke) of Ch'in. The bountiful resources of the region, enhanced further by the development of irrigation, the militant nature of the people who were part Hun, and the administrative and social reforms initiated by Legalist ministers enabled Ch'in to rise to power, to triumph over the other feudal states in 221 B.C., to conquer the empire and establish the first centralized government over China. Ch'ang-an (now Sian), the erstwhile capital of the Chou kings, became the national capital of a mighty empire from this time on, down through the Han, Sui and T'ang Dynasties.

Under the Ch'in state and later the Ch'in empire, the Chinese began to extend their power up the Kansu Corridor and into the regions of the modern provinces of Ninghsia and Chinghai. In the north, they completed the Great Wall to fend off the northern barbarians and to protect their flanks as they advanced westward. The advances made during the Ch'in Dynasty, which fell in 209 B.C., prepared the way for the great expansion of the Chinese into Turkestan during the Han period.

3. Han Dynasty

With the consolidation of Chinese unity a new power arose among the barbarians of the Northwest. This was the confederation of nomadic tribes formed under the leadership of the Hsiung-nu or Huns. Dur ng the civil war which overthrew the Ch'in

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ciations located at Urumchi. With the advent of the Chinese Communists, the nationalities cultural associations were taken over and in their place, cultural halls and cultural teams managed and operated by Communist cultural cadres were established in the cities and towns of Sinkiang.

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It is strange that in the pronouncements of Communist leaders and the reports of cultural and educational achievements in Sinkiang in the Communist press, no mention can be found on libraries. One can only speculate that with the expansion of publication enterprises under the Communists, the number of libraries must also have increased, as well as the number of books. In the library of the Sinkiang College of Nationalities, the number of books increased 700 per cent of the pre-1949 figure, and the number of books in the languages of the minority peoples increased by 1,400 per cent.

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VII. Organization

The organizational system of public information in the Northwest appears simple but is complicated. Government offices in charge of information services are Bureaus or Committees of Cultural and Educational Affairs on the provincial level, which receive instructions from Peking and control the various information services. Some of these, however, are directly controlled from Peking, and among the newspapers and journals are many which are in the hands of the party rather than of the Government.

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#175 at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National People's Congress on July 27, 1955:
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#668 "'Chinghai is an area where many nationalities live.... There are hidden counter-revolutionists and reactionary landlords, rich farmers who are still trying in every way to sabotage the unity of the nationalities. The methods used by these enemies for sabotage are dangerous and shrewd, mainly along two lines, namely, under the cover of religion or by upsetting international relations. The counter-revolutionists also sabotage our productive activities through arson, robbery, spreading of rumor, etc. They even organize open military rebellions. The reactionary landlords and rich farmers also stir up trouble between the middle farmers and the poor farmers. They infiltrate into the mutual cooperative groups and cooperatives to sabotage the mutual cooperative movement.'"

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175 14. The Sinkiang jih-pao, September 30, 1954, reported
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668 "In the first half of 1954 alone, we have discovered 3429 cases of counter-revolutionary plots in Sinkiang. According to incomplete statistics, we have made arrests in at least 15,000 cases of various criminal offenses during the past 5 years." (A Report on the Achievements of the Political Works in Sinkiang Province during the Past Five Years," by Vice-chairman Kao Chin-ch'un of Sinkiang Province.)

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[674] The above reports clearly indicate that there have been disturbances, resistance, sabotage and open rebellion besides ordinary crimes in every province of the Northwest from the very beginning of the Communist conquest until the present.

4. Conclusion

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• 105 The regular police system under the Communists is huge, yet
#668 it is only a very small part of the whole police system, much like
625 the part of an iceberg floating above the sea level. Strictly speaking, every branch of the Communist government, no matter whether it is legislative, administrative, judicial or economic, is a part of the police system and under the control of the Party. Moreover, every person in the country is organized and enlisted in the secret service. He is watching and being watched. Violators are subject to very heavy penalty. (See "The Regulations for Punishing the Counter-Revolutionaries" adopted by 11th meeting of the Central People's Government Council on February 20, 1951, in 1952 Jenmin shou-ts'e.)